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### Emotion and Cognitive Life in Medieval and Early Modern Philosophy

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Martin Pickavé and Lisa Shapiro (eds.): *Emotion and Cognitive Life in Medieval and Early Modern Philosophy*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012, pp. 296. £45.00 (hb). ISBN 9780199579914.

The thirteen papers in this volume contribute, both individually and collectively, a great deal of important analysis of the history of emotion and its role in cognitive life. Taken as a whole, the volume provides an interesting overview of multifarious concepts employed since antiquity to describe the phenomena we today rather loosely refer to as emotions.

Chapters are split across two main camps, medieval and early modern philosophy. The papers should not merely be grouped chronologically, however, as numerous themes and concepts carry across different chapters. Indeed this is one of the strengths of the volume: it highlights some common thoughts of temporally distant philosophers while assessing their disparities. In their introductory chapter, the editors point out that they are not attempting to trace a neat lineage of theories of emotions through the history of philosophy. They note, and the papers of the volume emphasize, that not all concepts endure through different ages and schools of thought.

Though numerous theories are analysed throughout the volume, a few key theorists claim much attention. Across the chapters on medieval philosophers, Aquinas's influence is especially apparent. For Aquinas, the passions are products of the sensitive appetite. This doctrine prompts enquiry into the relationship between passions and cognition, and a number of chapters show that this relationship is hardly simple. Peter King demonstrates that Aquinas, along with Augustine, posits 'volitional correlates' to the passions in the intellectual appetite; King calls these 'dispassionate passions' or 'pseudopassions' (25), and concludes that, for Aquinas's system at least, they fail as analogues to the passions (28–9).

Dominic Perler's article explores Aquinas's adaptation of Avicenna's theory of animal passions. On this account, animals have something like a capacity for making judgements, but they lack the freedom that humans possess (41). Animals cannot alter, and therefore cannot be responsible for, their passions. Humans too cannot be blamed for the initial passions that arise in us; we are, however, accountable if we sustain them by neglecting to 'fully activate [our] intellectual capacities' (43).

The subsequent chapters on medieval philosophy explore responses to Aquinas's account. Ian Drummond describes John Dun Scotus's departure from the Thomist school. Scotus claims that passions relating to our desires are passions of the will. The proper subject of a passion is an appetitive power (62), but the passions of the will arise due to the rational appetite (53). Meanwhile, Claude Panaccio looks at the theory of intellections and volitions put forward by William of Ockham. Though these two kinds of acts are 'irreducibly distinct', the faculties responsible for these acts, the intellect and the will, are 'the very same thing in a human person' (73).

Panaccio's main contribution to our thinking on Ockham's theory of passions is to show that, similarly for Scotus, Ockham allows for passions of the will (81). Finally, Simo Knuuttila recounts how Scotus's and Ockham's views were received into the sixteenth century, noting Suárez's criticisms of Scotist passions of the will.

Martin Pickavé, in his chapter on Adam Wodeham, addresses a common interpretation of the medieval debate over emotions as one of cognitivism versus non-cognitivism; that is, whether the contents of emotions include beliefs or judgements. He rejects this interpretation and instead claims that 'the medieval debate is fundamentally a dispute about intentionality' (113). The first half of the volume thereby shows that medieval theories of passions are complicated beasts, not easily comparable to contemporary theories and debates. What is common among all the medieval philosophers here examined is that emotion cannot be divorced from cognition in any simple manner.

The second half of the volume deals with early modern conceptions of emotions. Here we see that although the ambition of early modern philosophers – to explain emotions and their place in cognitive life – is consistent with those of the medieval period, their conceptual resources change as progress is made in the sciences of man. Descartes, for instance, attempted in *The Passions of the Soul* to explain the emotions *en physicien*. But as Dennis Des Chene highlights, though Descartes's dualism and mechanism distances him from a scholastic interpretation of the human being, it is difficult to see where '*la physique* ends and *la morale* begins' (177). For Descartes, the natural philosophical vocabulary with which to describe the passions includes moral notions such as 'good' and 'bad' (190). Adding to this explication of Cartesian passions, Paul Hoffman explores the notion of inclination of the will: Descartes and Malebranche, in the spirit of Aquinas, hold that an emotion is a 'movement of the soul' towards some good (161).

Continuing this theme, Deborah Brown notes the importance Malebranche places on agency and attention as our means of mastering our passions. Our freedom consists in 'the power of *directing through attention* the natural impulse within us towards particular objects that please us' (221). From this perspective, self-mastery requires psychophysiological knowledge of our passions: *la morale* and *la physique* go hand-in-hand.

Lisa Shapiro explains that Cartesian passions are forms of perceptions (much as Perler's article claims of Aquinas), and that, in fact, for both Descartes and Spinoza, 'all perception is affective': this view she calls 'Passionate Perception' (195). Combine this reading with Lilli Alanen's interpretation of Spinoza's theory of emotions and self-knowledge: it is through passive affects that we are able to perceive ourselves, yet these are merely confused ideas (239). For these two philosophers, then, emotions are fundamental to the cognitive life.

The final chapter, by Amy Schmitter, is an excellent piece on the history and influences of Hume's theory of the passions, with due attention paid to Malebranche and Hobbes. It is here that emotions as aspects of the social life become the topic of interest: for Hume, as for Malebranche, the transmission of an emotion from one person to another is mechanical in nature. Moreover, Schmitter's Hume recognizes a 'division of sentimental labor' by which 'affective experts' make judgements which set the standards of taste (274–5). It is through our sympathy-generating mechanisms that we are able to respect and value such judgements made by others (275).

Pickavé and Shapiro have collected together some very strong papers, each of which contributes to the aims of the volume. Those who take interest in the history of philosophy will appreciate the intricate and detailed analyses of these various theories of emotions. And those who are primarily interested in contemporary philosophy of emotion may well find motivation to challenge their own dependencies on contemporary concepts and debates.

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Christopher Janaway and Simon Robertson (eds.): *Nietzsche, Naturalism, and Normativity*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012, pp. 262. £40.00 (hb). ISBN 9780199583676.

This volume is one of three that examine relations between Nietzsche's thought – in particular his critique of morality – and contemporary work in ethics. It presents selected contributions to the research project 'Nietzsche and Modern Moral Philosophy' that was funded by the Arts and Humanities Research Council and ran from 2007 to 2010 at the University of Southampton. As the title suggests, this volume focuses on the relation between Nietzsche's naturalism and his views on what is nowadays called the phenomenon of normativity.

In fact, the issue of naturalism is present, but rather like a *basso continuo* that accompanies the score. The questions that I find most likely to be deepened by the contributions are located at a different level. Did Nietzsche hold, or was he committed to, recognizable views in metaethics? If so, how are those views best understood? This leads to the further question of what views in metaethics can claim inspiration or support from him, and which ones might turn out to be subject to a Nietzschean critique. Of course, if it is to be adequate, any such discussion will have to involve discussion of his substantial ethical views, his views of human psychology, agency and the human condition, and the papers in this volume fully bear this out. In this way, they naturally connect with the question of what kind